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AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF UNION
REPRESENTATION ON CORPORATE
BOARDS OF DIRECTORS
On May 13, 1980, Douglas Fraser, President of the United
Automobile Workers [UAW], was elected to the board of directors
of the Chrysler Corporation.1 Fraser's election was the product of
a four-year UAW campaign for representation. on the board of a
major auto manufacturer.2 The UAW's demand was a rare expres-
sion of such an interest on the part of a United States union,3 but
one that is likely to occur more frequently in the future.4
Fraser and future union representatives on corporate boards
face a serious conflict of interest under current corporate and labor
law. A corporate director has a fiduciary duty to the corporation's
shareholders.5 A union official, however, has a fiduciary duty to
the union and its members. A union official on a corporate board
thus has a duty to both union members and to shareholders. 6 When-
ever these two groups' interests conflicted, therefore, the union
officer would have to breach one of these duties.
The topic of this Comment is the manner in which the law
should deal with this conflict. Part. I' briefly examines the nature
of the fiduciary duties of union officers and corporate directors,
concluding that the conflict between these duties is irremediable
under existing law. Part II argues that relaxation of the usual
director's duty to shareholders in order to allow union representa-
tion of workers' interests 7 could be expected to have a generally
favorable impact on economic efficiency. Part III examines some
important noneconomic policies that would be furthered by allow-
ing union representation. Part IV presents a general standard for
1 New York Times, May 14, 1980, at D1, col. 3.
2 See New York Times, Oct. 24, 1979, at D1, col. 4. Cf. Murphy, Workers on
the Board: Borrowing a European Idea, 27 LAB. L.J. 751, 751 (1976) (referring to
the U.A.W.'s first announcement in 1976).
3 The U.A.W.'s 1976 demand for board representation was "without precedent
in American labor relations...." Murphy, supra note 2, at 751. See New York
Times, supra note 2. But see Blumberg, Reflections on Proposals for Corporate Re-
form Through Change in the Composition of the Board of Directors: "Special In-
terest" or "Public" Directors, 53 B.U.L. REV. 547, 566 (1973).
4 See Murphy, supra note 2, at 762; Blumberg, supra note 3, at 572-73; Raskin,
The Labor Leader As Company Director, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1980, at C1, col. 1.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 9-12.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 15-17.
7 The reason for this Comment's emphasis on .union, rather than worker, repre-
sentation is explained below. See infra note 68.
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the fiduciary duty of a union representative on a corporate board
with respect to both the workers and the shareholders, and- uses this
standard to define the union representative's responsibilities in
several important factual contexts.8
I. THE FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES OF CORPORATE
DIRECTORS AND UNION OFFICIALS
The directors of a publicly-held corporation are fiduciaries to
the corporation's shareholders. 9 The particular requirements of
this duty have been stated variously by different statutes 10 and
courts.1 1 One well-known description of the duty requires, inter
8 This Comment considers only the context of a large, publicly-held corporation
and a strong union, such as the Chrysler and UAW situation, because this is the
environment most likely to spawn such representation. It is assumed that the union
and the corporation have agreed voluntarily to such representation. See infra text
accompanying notes 21-33. This Comment does not address the broader issue
whether a statutory requirement of worker representation, which some Western
European countries have, see infra note 92, would be desirable for the United States.
Moreover, this Comment's analysis applies solely to minority union board representa-
tion, because majority union representation might raise issues of separation of owner-
ship and control. See generally F. KNriGrr, Risx, UNCERTAINTY AND PRoFTF 264-79
(1971); Dreze, Some Theory of Labor Management and Participation, 44 EcONO-
mETRucA 1125, 1134-35 (1976).
9 This duty has been described as owed to the corporation, to the shareholders,
and to both. Compare Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ("It is
clear that a director owes loyalty and allegiance to the company-a loyalty that is
undivided and an allegiance that is influenced . . . by no consideration other than
the welfare of the corporation."), with Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459,
507, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919) ("A business corporation is organized and carried
on primarily for the profit of the shareholders. The powers of the directors are to
be employed for that end."). This is unimportant, however, because under any of
these formulations, the duty is not owed to the employees. See, e.g., Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939) (referring to "the entire community of interests
in the corporation-creditors as well as shareholders") (footnote omitted). Although
in Shlensky v. Wrigley, the court indicated that corporate directors properly could
consider the effects of their decisions on the surrounding neighborhood, 95 Ill. App.
2d 173, 180-81, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (1968), the court's discussion makes it clear
that such factors may be given weight only to the extent that they affect the long-run
interests of the corporation. Id. The director's duty of care, therefore, will be re-
ferred to throughout this Comment as directed to the shareholders.
10 Compare MoDEr. BusnCEss ConpoRATioir ACT § 35 (1979) ("A director shall
perform his duties as a director ... in good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes
to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with such care as an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances.") with
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1975) ("Officers and directors shall be deemed to stand
in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and to its shareholders and shall discharge
[their] duties . . . in good faith, and with that diligence and care which ordinarily
prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions.").
" Compare infra text accompanying note 12 with Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh
Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 193, 123 N.E. 148, 151 (1919) ("The directors are
bound by all those rules of conscientious fairness, morality, and honesty in purpose
which the law imposes [on] those . . . under . . . fiduciary obligations and respon-
sibilities. They are held, in official action, to the extreme measure of candor, un-
selfishness, and good faith.").
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alia, a director's "loyalty and allegiance to the company . . . . He
may not profit at the expense of his corporation and in conflict with
its rights . . . . He is required to use his independent judgment.
In the discharge of his duties a director must... act honestly and
in good faith, but that is not enough. He must also exercise some
degree of skill and prudence and diligence." 12
A central premise established by the case law on directorial
duties is the prohibition against director advancement of private
interests at the expense of the shareholders. 1 3 Thus, a union board
representative would not be able to vote to further employee in-
terests, when they conflicted with shareholder interests, without
breaching the director's fiduciary duty to the shareholders. 1 4  Vot-
ing to further shareholder interests when they conflicted with
worker interests, however, could violate another duty to which
union officers are held by law. Section 501 of the Landrum-Griffin
Act imposes a fiduciary responsibility on union officials "to refrain
from dealing with [the union] as an adverse party or in behalf of
an adverse party in any matter connected with his duties .... ." 15
12 Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 677-78. In practical terms a corporate
director has several responsibilities. For example, directors are to exercise "in good
faith, the infinite details of business, including the wages which shall be paid to
employees, the number of hours they shall work, the conditions under which labor
shall be carried on, and the prices for which products shall be offered to the public."
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. at 507, 170 N.W. at 684.
13 See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 43 (3d Cir. 1947)
("[tihe directors owe a duty of managing the corporate affairs honestly and im-
partially in behalf of the corporation and all the stockholders ... .") (quoting 19
CJ.S. Corporations § 764); H. Vincent Allen & Assocs. v. Weis, 63 Ill. App. 3d 285,
290-91, 379 N.E.2d 765, 769 (1978) ("an important consideration in the deter-
mination of breach of fiduciary duty [is] whether the directors and officers were
'actively exploiting' their positions within the corporation for their own personal
benefit."); Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 219, 222 N.W.2d 71, 78 (1974) ("[w]e
acknowledge the well-recognized, common-law principle that [a director] may not
exploit his position as an 'insider' by appropriating to himself a business opportunity
properly belonging to the corporation."); Adelman v. Conotti Corp., 215 Va. 782,
790, 213 S.E.2d 774, 779 (1975) (quoting Rowland v. Kable, 174 Va. 343, 6 S.E.2d
633 (1940)) ("[tlhe unbending rule is that the director must . . . [not place] him-
self in a position where his individual interest clashes with his duty to his corpora-
tion."). The remedy for a breach of the director's duty can be a severe one. See,
e.g., N.Y. Trust Co. v. Amer. Realty Co., 244 N.Y. 209, 216, 155 N.E. 102, 104
(1926) ("it has frequently been held that a director or officer of a corporation must
account to the corporation for profits received in disregard of duty owed to the
corporation.").
14But see Comment, Serving Two Masters: Union Representation on Corporate
Boards of Directors, 81 CoLTJm. L. Rzv. 639, 652-60 (1981), in which the author
asserts that this may not violate the director's fiduciary duty to shareholders. Be-
cause the possibility of a court finding that there is a violation remains, however,
this Comment advocates an explicit change in the law. See infra note 17.
15Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act § 501
(a), 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1976). The pertinent text of this provision is as follows:
The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor
organization occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and
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Advancing the shareholders' interests, when worker or union inter-
ests were implicated,16 arguably would be dealing as an "adverse
party," and therefore would be a violation of section 501.17
The issue, then, is what should be the legal standard of a union
official's fiduciary duty as a corporate director. This Comment
argues that the usual corporate director's duty to shareholders
should be relaxed to allow a union representative to act to further
worker interests. The economic and non-economic reasons for this
conclusion are presented in the next two sections of this Comment.
its members as a group. It is, therefore, the duty of each such person,
taking into account the special problems and functions of a labor organi-
zation .... to refrain from dealing with such organization as an adverse
party or in behalf of an adverse party in any matter connected with his
duties and from holding or acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest
which conflicts with the interests of such organization ....
16 Conflicts between these two duties-to the shareholders and to the workers-
could arise anytime possible board decisions would have the effect of imposing costs
on the workers as a group, such as board decisions concerning plant closings and
layoffs. Cf. New York Times, Nov. 26, 1979, at D9, col. 1 (U.A.W. president
Fraser's remarks about a Chrysler plant-closing). Less dramatically, board decisions
that directly or indirectly affect working conditions also may impose costs on the
workers, and thus give rise to a conflict of duties.
17But see Comment, supra note 14, which argues that a union official on a
corporate board in most circumstances would not violate section 501 of the Landrum-
Griffin Act. That Comment argues, moreover, that a union director would not
violate either section 8 (a) (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, making it unlaw-
ful for management to "dominate or interfere with the . .. administration of any
labor organization," National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (2), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 15 8(a) (2) (1976), or the union official's duty of fair representation, which pro-
hibits arbitrary or discriminatory treatment of employees or groups of employees,
see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323
U.S. 192, 201-04 (1944). That Comment also contends that a union representative
on a corporate board generally could represent employee interests without violating
the fiduciary duty to the shareholders. Comment, supra note 14, at 652-60.
That Comment admits, however, that there could be labor law violations found
under at least some courts' analyses. Id. 642. In addition, the Comment notes
that section 501 "fails to define the precise scope of [a union] official's fiduciary
obligation," id. 645, and that a director owing a duty to groups other than share-
holders, such as "employees, consumers, and the general public, does not yield a
precise standard for evaluating the conduct of corporate directors," id. 655. More-
over, the Comment's general conclusions concerning the corporate director's fiduciary
duty explicitly only apply to actions designed to advance at least the long-rm
interests of the shareholders, because few courts have been willing to discard totally
the traditional model of a duty owed solely to the shareholders. See id.
This Comment does not question these general conclusions. Rather than pos-
sibly opening the union board representative to liability under differing interpreta-
tions of the admittedly ambiguous legal standards embodied in various corporate
and labor law provisions, however, this Comment advocates an explicit acceptance
and legislative (or, failing that, judicial) revision of the provisions defining corporate
directors' duties to provide for differing fiduciary obligations of such union officials.
Furthermore, this Comment recognizes that the shape of this fiduciary duty for a
union official on a corporate board is ultimately a question of legal policy, and
therefore presents economic and noneconomic policy grounds supporting the legal
changes advocated.
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II. ECONOMIC POLICY AND UNION REPRESENTATION
The potential economic impact of union representation of
employee rather than shareholder interests on a corporate board
supports modification of the director's usual fiduciary duty to share-
holders. Although somewhat theoretical in nature, the economic
analysis that follows suggests that union board membership on the
-workers' behalf would increase both allocative efficiency-the optimal
deployment of society's resources-and efficiency in the management
of the specific corporation.
The economic approach of this Comment is primarily "insti-
tutional" in character,18 focusing on transactional and organiza-
tional costs: "the comparative costs of planning, adapting, and
monitoring task completion under alternative governance struc-
tures." 19 Thus, this approach entails analysis of the relative costs
and efficiencies resulting from alternative ways of organizing and
managing a corporation.20 The two such ways relevant to this
38 One author described an institutional approach as the following:
A broadly based interest among economists in what might be referred to
as the "new institutional economics" has developed in recent years.
Aspects of mainline microtheory, economic history, the economics of prop-
erty rights, comparative systems, labor economics, and industrial organiza-
tion have each had a bearing on this renaissance. The common threads
that tie these various studies together are: (1) an evolving consensus that
received microtheory, as useful and powerful as it is for many purposes,
operates at too high a level of abstraction to permit many important
microeconomic phenomena to be addressed in an uncontrived way; and
(2) a sense that the study of "transactions," which concerned the insti-
tutionalists in the profession some forty years ago, is really a core matter
and deserves renewed attention. Unlike the earlier institutionalists, how-
ever, the current group is inclined to be eclectic. The new institutional
economists both draw on microtheory and, for the most part, regard what
they are doing as complementary to, rather than a substitute for, conven-
tional analysis.
0. W=LUAmsoN, MARKETS AND IIELARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND A.NTRUST I.MLICA-
TboNS 1 (1975); of. J. ADDIsoN & W. SIEmBET, ThE MAP=xr For LABon: AN
ANALYTncAL TREATmENT 5 (1979) ("Institutionalists . . . reject abstract general
theories and advocate an inductive and interdisciplinary approach .... ").
190. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Ap-
proach 7 (Feb. 1981) (Center for the Study of Org'l Innov., Univ. of Pennsylvania,
Disc. Paper No. 96).
2 0 See generally Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Con-
siderations, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1439, 1442-47 (1974).
There is a body of formal, mathematical economic literature on worker partici-
pation. See, e.g., J. VANEK, Thm Gm=Ar, THEonY OF LABOR-MANAGED EcoNOmEs
(1970); Atkinson, Worker Management and the Modem Industrial Enterprise, 87
Q.J. EcoNr. 375 (1973); Domar, The Soviet Collective Farm as a Producer Coopera-
tive, 56 Am. Ecox. REv. 734 (1966); Furubotn, The Long-Run Analysis of the
Labor-Managed Firm: An Alternative Interpretation, 66 Am. EcoN. REv. 104 (1976);
Meade, The Theory of Labour-Managed Firms and of Profit Sharing, 82 EcoN. J.
402 (1972); Steinherr, On the Efflciency of Profit Sharing and Labor Participation
in Management, 8 BEr L J. EcoN. 545 (1977); Ward, The Firm in Illyria: Market
Syndicalism, 48 Am. EcoN. REv. 566 (1958). For a rigorous, but nonmathematical,
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discussion are the traditional corporate board and a corporate
governance structure that includes union representation of workers
on the board of directors.
Four types of costs and efficiencies are analyzed in the following
subsections. The first subsection examines the agreement to pro-
vide the union with board representation in light of the economic
theory of free exchange. The second subsection assesses the dis-
tribution of the risk of partial or complete corporate failure between
shareholders and workers, along with the relative ability of each
group to shift this risk. The third subsection analyzes the impli-
cations of union representation for the efficient governance of the
contractual relationship between the union and the corporation,
particularly in light of two kinds of uncertainty inherent in that
relationship. Finally, the fourth subsection examines the effects that
union board representation might have on the ability of the board
to ensure that the corporate management is operating efficiently.
A. The Economics of Free Exchange
The union's and the corporation's agreement to have union
board representation is prima facie an economically beneficial ex-
change between the two parties.21 This presumption of economic
benefit stems from the basic proposition of economic theory that,
given certain assumptions,22 "[v]oluntary trade is mutually ben-
treatment of worker management, see Vanek, Decentralization Under Workers-
Management: A Theoretical Appraisal, 59 Am. EcoN. 1 Ev. 1006 (1969).
This literature is not examined in this Comment for two reasons. First, the
formal models in this literature are, for the most part, concerned with the worker-
managed enterprise, not with union (or worker) representation. For an exception,
see Steinherr, supra, this note. Steinherr concludes that, "whatever the objective
function of the firm, it requires fairly mild assumptions to make some profit sharing
and participation in decision making always optimal." Id. 552.
Second, and more important, formal neoclassical economic models, which
assume that the firm is producing efficiently, are poorly suited to examination of
the relative efficiency of alternative means of organizing transactions within the
firm. See 0. Williamson, The Evolution of Hierarchy 1-2 (Fels Discussion Paper
No. 91, July, 1976) (located in the University of Pennsylvania School of Public
and Urban Policy library). French economist Jacques Dreze points to "the merits
and limitations of static equilibrium analysis, which provides very clear answers to
over-simplified questions .... Dreze, supra note 8, at 1128.
21 Note that the union receives from the exchange a board position presumably
to represent the workers. This Comment argues that because of economic and
noneconomic rationales the union should be able to represent the worker on the
board without legal conflict of interest problems. Unless the parties explicitly
indicate to the contrary, therefore, it is presumed that management and the board
or shareholders understood that the union would represent worker interests. UAW
president Fraser made it very clear prior to his election to the Chrysler board that
he would represent worker interests. See T. C. Hayes, Fraser Board Role Riles
Critics, Raises Questions, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1979, at D1, col. 1.
2 2 The most important of these assumptions is that individuals act rationally to
maximize their individual welfare. See generally J. HENDmsoN & R. QtuAN,
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eficial." 23 Given some additional assumptions,2 4 economic theory
asserts that voluntary exchange will result in the shift of resources
MICrOECONOIC THEORY 6 (2d ed. 1971); J. HIRsHLEIFER, PRICE THEoRY AN
APPLICATIONS 88-89 (2d ed. 1980); W. NICHOLSON, INMErImATE MICROECO-
NoMics AND rrs APPLICATON 9, 52 (2d ed. 1979); G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF
PRICE 55-60 (3d ed. 1966). For an effective defense of this fundamental postulate
of economics, see R. PosNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIs OF LAw 12-14 (2d ed. 1977).
Also very important is the assumption that individuals filly understand the
relevant characteristics of the goods available and know their relative prices, and
in particular that such information is not available to only one party. See Arrow,
The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market
Versus Non-market Allocation, in 1 StmcoMMqrr= ON EcoNoMY m Gow n Nsmmrr,
JoINT ECONOMIC Couiff=, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., THE ANALYsIS AND EVALUA-
TION OF PUBLIC ExPENmrrTuns: THE PPB SYsTEM 47, 54-56 (Comm. Print 1969);
Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
84 Q.J. EcoN. 488 (1970).
This assumption about perfect information, though never met in an absolute
sense, is less significant in the strong union/large corporation context assumed
throughout this Comment than elsewhere. See supra note 8. Both union and
management negotiators may be assumed to have substantially correct information
about the relative values to each of them of the different subjects of the negotiation,
including union representation on the corporate board, at least by the time they
settle. The ongoing nature of the collective bargaining relationship makes this
particularly true because each side can draw on prior events as a source of such
information. In addition, an employer is obligated to provide certain types of
information needed by the union to carry out its duties of negotiating and policing
the collective agreement. See, e.g., NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432
(1967); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964).
The only potential information problem occurs with respect to the shareholders,
who may not be able to assess a management proposal for union representation.
See infra text accompanying notes 81-82. This possible inability is a troubling
problem, but is not restricted to the issue of worker representation. Moreover,
management ostensibly is seeking to further shareholder interests. See infra note
24. Union representation also may help alleviate this general problem by providing
directors and shareholders with an alternative source of information to management.
See infra text accompanying note 91.
23 J. HIRsHLEIST., supra note 22, at 190. See generally id. 164-75; W. NICHOL-
soN, supra note 22, at 9, 44-51.
24 Th most important assumptions are that there be no significant costs (or
benefits) not borne (received) by the party who caused them and that transaction
costs be insignificant. See generally Arrow, supra note 22, at 55-60. Neither of
these is liable to cause any problems in the strong union-large corporation setting
assumed herein. To obtain the exchange agreement providing for union repre-
sentation on the board, there may be several transaction costs. The principal costs
would be negotiating, drafting, and administrating the agreement. The only effect
such costs could have would be to prevent an otherwise efficient change from being
negotiated; they could not facilitate negotiation of an inefficient change. Hence,
they raise no issue with regard to the efficiency of a completed agreement for union
representation.
External costs not borne by the causer raise no problems unless one posits that
corporate directors or union leaders seek to advance interests other than those of
the shareholders or workers respectively. This would suggest a general problem
that would require broad institutional reform to correct, and would be only inci-
dentally related to the specific issue of union representation. Indeed, union repre-
sentation could help alleviate this problem. See infra notes 134-38 & accompanying
text. In addition, should these assumptions fail, later sections of this Comment
establish that union representation on the board is nonetheless efficient. See infra
sections IIC & IID.
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"to those uses in which the value to consumers, as measured by
their willingness to pay, is highest." 25 Given such a shift of re-
sources "pursuant to a voluntary transaction, we can be reasonably
confident that the shift involves a net increase in efficiency." 26
The collective bargaining context, however, differs in impor-
tant respects from the economic model of voluntary exchange. In
particular, the collective bargaining relationship is not characterized
solely by the voluntariness of the free exchange postulates, but
rather involves some external compulsion: the parties must
negotiate within a structure of legal requirements and limitations. 27
But within this structure there remains room for the proposition
to operate, in the limited sense that each party can be assumed to
seek out the best possible bargain it can attain given the constraints
on its behavior.28 Thus, for example, a union that accepted an
eight percent wage increase and a certain package of benefits and
rules changes presumably thought it made the workers better off
than any other choice to which the employer would have agreed.
29
Similarly, management presumably thought that the agreement was




R. POSNER, supra note 22, at 10. Gains to the parties to the exchange do
not in all cases enhance overall societal efficiency, which has been defined as
"exploiting economic resources in such a way that 'value'-human satisfaction as
measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay for goods and services-is
maximized." R. POSNER, supra note 22, at 10 (emphasis in original). An exchange
may benefit the parties to it but also might impose costs on some third party such
that total value is reduced. Such an exchange would be inefficient for society as a
whole. Allocative efficiency is thus a measure of social, as opposed to individual,
welfare.
26 R. PosurE, supra note 22, at 11.
27 See, e.g., National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, §§ 1-13, 49 Stat
449 (1935), as amended by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
(Landrum-Griffin) Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-197, 401-531 (1976)). There are also, of course, practical restraints.
See, e.g., Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice Through the
Looking Glass, 2 BUFFALo L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1952); Cox, The Legal Nature of
Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 3 (1958).
28 In mathematical economic terms, the parties face constrained maximization
problems, and will solve them to attain a local (as opposed to a global) maximum.
Assuming that the external constraints were properly designed to increase social
welfare, this local welfare maximization can be assumed to be efficient. Even if
the external constraints are designed poorly, however, such local maximization would
normally be efficiency-enhancing. See generally F. ScHERER, IonusmJ..L MARKET
STucrTrE AND EcoNoMIc PERFomArcE 24-29 (2d ed. 1980).
2 9 It is assumed that there are no problems of inappropriate motivation of
union officials such as desire to profit at the expense of employees. Cf. supra note
24.
30 Management purportedly tries to operate in the best interests of the corpora-
tion. Although this is a standard assumption in economic analysis, see J. HmsH-
.EWEE, supra note 22, at 265-66, it is not a necessary assumption because the
board of directors or the stockholders must vote the union representative onto the
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Hence, when the Chrysler Corporation acceded to the UAW's
demand for a position on the board of directors, it presumably
considered this the best bargain it could reach for the corporation.31
In fact, the benefit that Chrysler received by electing Douglas Fraser
to its board of directors was both obvious and substantial. In
return for the board position, the UAW agreed to $203 million
worth of concessions for Chrysler from the collective bargaining
agreement that it had negotiated with the three major domestic
automakers-Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors. 32  These enor-
mous concessions were critical to Chrysler's continued operation. 33
Thus, both parties benefited by the agreement.
In future cases, the quid pro quo for union board representa-
tion may be less evident. Nonetheless, the courts should presume,
in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, that both the
union and the corporation benefit from such agreements.
B. The Distribution of the Risk of Corporate Failure
The traditional explanation for vesting corporate control in
the shareholders is that shareholders, by providing the capital for
the enterprise, bear the risk of failure.34 It thus seems equitable
board. Unless one posits that the directors are ineffective or seek to further their
own interests rather than the corporation's, therefore, there is no problem. See
supra note 24 and infra text accompanying notes 79-83 & 91.
31 This presumption would, of course, be rebuttable by shareholders in a suit
against the board for breach of its fiduciary duties if the union representative had
been elected by the board. But the burden on the stockholder-plaintiffs would
require that they show both that better alternatives realistically were available and
that the directors breached their fiduciary duties in approving union representation.
The usual standards would apply for the issue whether the directors had breached
their fiduciary duties. See generally W. FLETCHm, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRrvATE Coiu'oPtxoNs, §§ 989-1009 (rev. penn. ed. 1975).
32 New York Times, Oct. 26, 1979, at Al, col. 4. The U.A.W. had previously
agreed to let Chrysler defer $200 million in pension fund contributions for one year,
id. D6, col 3, and later agreed to an additional $243 million in contract concessions,
after Congress made government loan guarantees for Chrysler contingent upon such
agreement, see New York Times, fan. 6, 1980, § 1, at 24, col. 3.
33 It could be argued that Chrysler acquiesced to the UAW's demands under
duress, and that the courts should therefore refuse to recognize the agreement as
being in Chrysler's best interests. But this argument is very weak in light of the
contract concessions agreed to by the union, see supra note 32 and accompanying
text, and the very limited voting power UAW president Fraser will have as one of
18 board members, see Fraser Board Role Riles Critics, Raises Questions, supra note
21, at D1, col. 1.
34 See, e.g., F. KNIGHT, supra note 8; at 270: "With human nature as we know
it it would be impracticable or very unusual for one man to guarantee to another [a
fixed wage] without being given power to direct his work." For a nice summary of
this argument for control by those who provide capital, see Jonsson, Labour as Risk-
Bearer, 2 CAMBRIDGE J. EcoN. 373, 373-74 (1978). For a very different explanation
of control by capital, see C. IANDBLOM, PoLrncs AND MA~ums 104-05 (1977)
(suggesting that enterprises owned by workers who hire capital "do not exist simply
because [of] . . . the historically given distribution of wealth .... ").
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to give the shareholders as much control as possible over their
fates. Efficiency considerations also dictate placing ultimate control
in the hands of those with the incentive to run the enterprise well-
those with something to lose. This reasoning for exclusive share-
holder control is, however, flawed, because employees also bear
some of the risk that a company will fail,3 5 and are less able to
protect themselves from that risk than are shareholders.
The wages and other benefits that workers can extract from the
corporation through collective bargaining are, of course, related to
the general financial health of the corporation. The most direct
and serious risk borne by the workers, however, is job loss. This
risk represents two kinds of potential costs to the worker. The first
is the transition costs of moving from one job to another. This
includes income lost during the interim period, job search costs, and
possible moving costs, as well as the emotional impact of unemploy-
ment. These costs will vary with local and general employment
levels in the worker's field. In addition, transition costs may
include losses from forced sale of assets such as a house, car, or used
furniture, especially when job loss is sudden and unexpected.
The second type of cost borne by laid-off workers is lost
economic rent: 36 the wage loss the worker may take in a new job.
In highly unionized industries, with which this Comment is pri-
marily concerned, this loss can be considerable. For example, an
auto worker who is forced to leave the industry and take an un-
skilled or semiskilled job in a nonunion industry probably will
suffer a substantial loss in income.
Thus, the proposition that the suppliers of capital should
control the enterprise because of the risk they bear ignores the
reality that workers bear a substantial part of the risk of enterprise
failure. This consideration is increasingly true in our inter-
dependent modern society, as the option of total economic inde-
-5 See generally Jonsson, supra note 34.
The general argument here, in economic terms, can also be stated as an ex-
ternality problem, see supra note 24: the board is not taking into account the full
economic cost of its decisions. Union representation might make the board more
cognizant of the external costs imposed on workers, and thus lead to more socially
optimal corporate decision-making.
36 Economic rent is
the difference between what the factors, or productive services, of a re-
source-owner earn in their current occupation and the minimum sum he is
willing to accept to keep [them] there. It is then a measure of the resource-
owner's gain from having the opportunity of placing his factors in the
chosen occupation at the existing factor price, given the prices his factors
would earn in all other occupations.
EJ. MissuN, CosT-BENEF'T ANALYsIS 55 (1976).
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pendence is becoming less and less realistic.3 7
Workers not only bear a substantial portion of the risk of
failure, they also are less able to protect themselves from this risk.
Providers of capital can reduce the risk of losses from bad invest-
ments by diversifying their security holdings.38 Workers, on the
other hand, can reduce risk only in much more limited ways.
Workers cannot insure themselves against job loss, except to a
limited extent through government unemployment insurance pro-
grams.39 The primary problem with a worker attempting to insure
privately against this risk is "moral hazard": 40 an insurer could
not be certain that a worker had not subtly but intentionally
brought about his or her own job loss. Nor can workers diversify
effectively, because "a worker cannot easily put small bits of his
effort into a large number of different jobs." 41 Virtually all jobs
require a substantial portion of the worker's waking hours.
4 2
In short, workers not only bear part of the risk of the enter-
prise-particularly in troubled economic times and in declining
industries-but they also are much less able than investors to reduce
3 7 "Total economic independence" is the ability to live independently of the
economic system. A laid-off worker cannot go live off of the land-by farming and
hunting-with little or no investment. Workers thus are more subject to cyclical
downturns such as recessions than are shareholders.
38 See K. Aanow, EssAYs N = Tmony OF Ris-BEAniNG 135 (1971); Meade,
supra note 20, at 426.
39 See C. Azariadis, Implicit Contracts and Related Topics: A Survey 3 (Nov.
1979) (unpublished paper in the University of Pennsylvania's Lippincott Library).
Cf. WmLLAMsoN, supra note 18, at 70 ("That .. .workers ... , as a group, can
pool risks only with difficulty seems evident .. "). The government can only insure
workers to a limited extent because it faces the same problem private insurers face-
moral hazard. See infra note 40 & accompanying text.
40 See K. Armow, supra note 38, at 142-43, 202-03; C. Azariadis, supra note 39,
at 3. Moral hazard stems from the ability and willingness of workers to misrepresent
information and intentions to further their self-interest. It derives from an asym-
metric distribution of information: only the worker can verify whether she/he worked
to the best of his or her ability, or whether the layoff was in part a result of poor
work or even intentional. WHLIAmSoN, supra note 18, at 31-33.
4 1 Meade, supra note 20, at 426.
4 2 Companies require substantial commitment by the worker because the firm
otherwise incurs three kinds of costs: set-up costs-the lessened efficiency of work at
the beginning and end of a shift-job-specific training costs, see WII.LiAmsoN, supra
note 18, at 62-63, and administrative costs. Thus, it is more efficient, everything
else being equal, for fewer workers to work longer hours than for many workers to
work a few hours apiece. Obviously, a point of diminishing returns beyond which
this proposition no longer holds true will be reached because worker productivity
will decrease with fatigue.
There are also reasons why a worker would prefer to spend most or all of his
hours working at one job. The most important reason is the cost of transportation
and lost time involved in moving from one job to another. In addition, jobs for
which part-time work is available often involve low-skilled work with low pay rates.
1982.]
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their risk through direct or indirect diversification. 43  Hence, the
argument for giving corporate control to suppliers of capital because
they bear the risk of the enterprise is seriously flawed.44 Indeed,
the distribution of risk in the modern public corporation suggests
that some worker representation on the board of directors would be
appropriate on grounds of both efficiency and equity.
C. The Economics of Contractual Governance
Optimizing the efficiency of supply of different production-
process inputs-labor, raw materials, and component parts-requires
the adoption of appropriate organizational forms and governance
structures for contractual relationships.45 Relations to sources of
inputs may vary from classical arms-length "spot-market" contract-
ing-in which each transaction is discrete, requiring no past or future
relationship, and takes place at a market-defined price-to vertical
integration, in which the corporation merges with the source of
supply.46 Between these two extremes is a range of alternatives.
Professor Oliver E. Williamson has developed a rudimentary
general theory that describes the effects of three important variables
on the efficient governance structure for relationships like those
between producers and input suppliers.47 According to this frame-
work, the most efficient form of contractual governance for a spe-
cific relationship depends on three dimensions: (1) "the degree to
which durable transaction-specific investments are incurred"; (2) the
frequency with which transactions recur; and (3) uncertainty.4 In
this section, Professor Williamson's analytic framework is described
and then applied to labor-management relations.
43 Insurance is an indirect form of diversification. See supra text accompanying
note 39. The insurance company diversifies its risks by pooling a large number of
uncorrelated risks together. See K. Amow, supra note 38, at 200-01.
44 Given an awareness that workers bear a significant share of the risk of the
enterprise, it becomes very difficult to assess qualitatively the relative sizes of the
risks borne by investors and workers in a specific corporation. These relative sizes
would depend on the dollar values and probabilities of the potential losses, the degree
of diversification, and the degree of risk aversion of each group. For an interesting
viewpoint on this last factor see F. KNiGHT, supra note 8, at 269-70 (suggesting
that entrepreneurs are "confident and venturesome" and that employees are "doubt-
ful and timid").
45 Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Re-
lations, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 233, 235 (1979).
46 This example of vertical integration would fall into a category of corporate
form that Williamson calls "unified governance." Id. 253. Both "parties"--manu-
facturer and supplier-are under the same governance structure. For a more
extensive discussion of the unified governance structure, see infra section II C 3.
4 7 Williamson, supra note 45, at 233.
48 Id. 239.
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1. The Three Dimensions of Contractual Governance
a. Transaction-Specific Investments
A durable transaction-specific investment is a long-term invest-
ment whose value in other uses is "much smaller than [in] the
specialized use for which it has been intended," 49 and whose cost
may only be recouped over an extended period of time in the in-
tended use. Where such investments have been made, "the specific
identity of the parties has important cost-bearing consequences." 50
For example, a supplier who purchases expensive specialized equip-
ment or builds a new plant in a particular location in order to suit
a particular manufacturer's needs may be "effectively 'locked into'
the transaction to a significant degree" 51 because his equipment or
location is poorly suited for supplying other companies. If the
manufacturer cannot costlessly turn to alternative suppliers, the
effect is symmetrical, and the manufacturer also is committed to
the relationship.
52
Employment relationships frequently involve investments in
human assets that are transaction-specific. Employees become more
valuable to the employer as they acquire job-specific knowledge and
skills through specialized training and learning-by-doing.5 3 Hence,
if an employer makes a substantial transaction-specific investment
that is symmetrical because the employees cannot use the acquired
skills as well in other jobs, both the employer and the union will
have an interest in forging a close and continuing relationship. A
breakdown in such a relationship-for example, a plant-closing be-
cause of a long-term inability to agree to employment terms-
normally will entail a loss in efficiency as the workers move to other
49 Id. 240.
5OId. (emphasis in original).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See WLLImASON, supra note 18, at 62-63; Williamson, supra note 45, at 240.
See generally P. DOE~uNOER & M. PionE; INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANpowER
AsjALYsis 13-17 (1971).
The value to the employer of such job-specific knowledge and skills derives
from their economizing propensities with respect to "task idiosyncracies," which
can arise in at least four ways: (1) equipment idiosyncracies, due to in-
completely standardized. .. equipment, the unique characteristics of which
become known through experience; (2) process idiosyncracies, which are
fashioned or "adopted" by the worker and his associates in specific oper-
ating contexts; (3) informal team accommodations, attributable to mutual
adaptation among parties engaged in recurrent contact... ; and (4) com-
munication idiosyncracies with respect to information channels that are of
value only within that firm.
WnmrmmsoN, supra note 18, at 62.
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employment opportunities in which their value is less because the
job-specific knowledge and skills are useless.
b. Recurrence of Transactions
Professor Williamson's second variable is the frequency of the
transaction. When transactions are discrete, the costs of negotiating
and setting up a private contractual governance structure will nor-
mally outweigh any benefits that might derive from such an ar-
rangement. When transactions are continual or recurrent, how-
ever, these costs may be spread over many transactions, and thus
are less likely to outweigh the benefits of a private governance
structure.
In the employment relationship, the workers and the employer
are engaged in a continuous process of labor supply and demand.
Because this Comment is concerned only with these recurrent trans-
actions, the analysis below will ignore the governance of discrete
transactions, and will discuss the effects of changes in the other
two variables only.
c. Uncertainty
The third parameter affecting the efficiency of particular or-
ganizational forms is uncertainty of future events and economic
conditions. No labor agreement can provide for all future con-
tingencies, because of both the limited ability of the parties to define
all possible future conditions and to specify their agreement pre-
cisely, and the high cost of the extended negotiations that would
result if the parties had to discuss and agree on all conceivable
contingencies. Grievance and arbitration procedures and appro-
priate legal standards provide a flexible governance structure for
defining rights and responsibilities in many situations not provided
for by the terms of the labor contract. As the degree of uncertainty
increases, however, a relationship relying primarily on contractual
provisions will experience severe strains in attempting to adapt to
unforeseen situations.
This strain results from each party's attempts to obtain what-
ever incremental gains can be acquired from the unprovided-for
situation and to shift any unexpected costs onto the other party.
Professor Williamson denotes this problem "opportunism."
Although both parties have a long-term interest in effect-
ing adaptations of a joint profit-maximizing kind, each
also has an interest in appropriating as much of the gain
as he can on each occasion to adapt. Efficient adaptations
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which would otherwise be made thus result in costly hag-
gling or even go unmentioned, lest the gains be dissipated
by costly subgoal pursuit. Governance structures which
attenuate opportunism and otherwise infuse confidence are
evidently needed.
5 4
2. Efficient Governance Structures
The appropriate governance structure for any particular trans-
action depends upon the dimensions of the three variables outlined
above. For the recurring relationships with which this Comment
is concerned, the available alternatives span a spectrum rather than
exist as discrete organizational forms. For supply contracts for a
fungible good like cotton, the availability of legal redress in the
courts and of alternative sources of supply will usually suffice to
mitigate opportunistic behavior. At the other extreme, the appro-
priate governance structure may be unified, as with an electrical
utility that finds it necessary to expand backwards into coal mining
to ensure a regular supply of fuel. More generally, unified gov-
ernance means that "the transaction is removed from the market
and organized within the firm subject to an authority relation." 55
The most efficient governance structure approaches unified govern-
ance when the two remaining variables-uncertainty and invest-
ment-specificity-are high, indicating that a strong bond between the
parties is needed.
Professor Williamson has applied the label "bilateral govern-
ance" to the broad middle ground between the extremes of market
contracting and unified governance. Williamson's prototype of
this form of governance is collective bargaining and the entire
labor-management relationship. 6 Bilateral governance provides
a mechanism for some joint contract-term decisionmaking flexibil-
ity,57 but this flexibility ultimately is limited by the explicit terms
of the agreement.
An example will help to illustrate the relationship between
the alternative governance structures and the two variables with
which we are primarily concerned, which can be divided into three
rough dimensions for analytical purposes: high, intermediate, and
low. Assume that two parties are planning a recurrent input-supply
relationship that involves both a highly transaction-specific invest-
54 Williamson, supra note 45, at 242 (emphasis added).
55 Id. 250.
56 W3L AmsoN, supra note 18, at 72-76; see Williamson, supra note 45, at 250.
57 The "combination" between employer and union can be seen intuitively in
such mechanisms as grievance panels for handling employee complaints that are
staffed by union and employer representatives.
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ment-such as the construction of a plant that has no other eco-
nomically feasible use because of its location or design-and inter-
mediate uncertainty. The appropriate governance structure for
this highly transaction-specific investment in a recurring relation-
ship from the standpoint of societal economic efficiency necessarily
would be more complex than simple market contracting, because
any rupture in the relationship would result in the loss of the
transaction-specific investment, which would be a waste of scarce
economic resources.5 s Furthermore, the party who would have to
make the transaction-specific investment will refuse to agree to do
so if the other party would remain free to end the relationship at
will during any dispute. Conversely, both parties may balk at
submitting to a long-term relationship in which either one may
seek to take advantage of the other's inability to leave at will. In
such circumstances, the parties may seek to design a flexible govern-
ance structure that leaves room for contract-term decisionmaking,
yet provides some assurances against opportunistic behavior. In an
extreme case, the cost and imperfect operation of bilateral govern-
ance may make it more efficient for the parties to merge, because
an economical relationship may otherwise fail to materialize be-
cause of contracting difficulties.
High uncertainty reinforces the tendency toward a unified
governance structure. If the contractually unprovided-for event
were to occur frequently because of rapid changes in the economy
or industry, then a bilateral governance structure might collapse
because of frequent, costly haggling and mistrust. Unified gov-
ernance allows sequential adaptation to changes in the market or
economy, unconstrained by the terms of even a relatively flexible
contract, and thus helps to mitigate the impact of uncertainty with-
out allowing one party to gain at the expense of the other.
Both of these variables need not be high, however, for unified
governance to be the most efficient organizational structure, ac-
cording to Professor Williamson's model. First, if the transaction-
specific investment is not symmetrical, that is, if only one of the
parties is to make such an investment, the party making that invest-
ment will be at a serious bargaining disadvantage during the con-
tract term. The party making the transaction-specific investment
5 8 Incentives for market trading or other governance structures weaken as the
transactions become progressively more specialized from the transaction-specific in-
vestment. "The reason is that, as the specialized human and physical assets become
more specialized to a single use, and hence less transferable to other uses, economies
of scale can be as fully realized by the buyer as by an outside supplier." William-
son, supra note 45, at 252 (footnote omitted). The choice then becomes unified
governance because of its "superior adaptive properties." Id. 252-53.
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will be subject to the ill effects of the other party's opportunism,
because the benefits to that party are contingent upon continuing
execution of the relationship.59 Unified governance can attenuate
opportunism in such circumstances, and thus save resources that
otherwise would be expended on negotiation or litigation, or facili-
tate an agreement that would not otherwise be reached.
The second situation in which unified governance is the op-
timal structure, according to the Williamson model, is when either
investment specificity or uncertainty is of an intermediate degree
and the other variable is at a high level.60 In such cases, the degree
of investment specificity and uncertainty is high enough to create
a very serious potential for opportunistic behavior, and potential
contractual parties will normally be unable to agree to anything
short of unified governance in order to continue the relationship.
3. Application to the Labor-Management Context.
Professor Williamson characterizes the typical collective-bar-
gaining relationship as one of bilateral governance with an inter-
mediate degree of both investment specificity and uncertainty. 61 As
this Comment has explained, the most efficient governance structure
in such a situation may be closer to unified than to bilateral gov-
ernance if investment specificity is asymmetrical or if either uncer-
tainty or investment specificity shifts from an intermediate to a
high level.
a. Asymmetric Investment
It is quite possible that employers make greater transaction-
specific investments than do workers. Corporations invest in
the training and on-the-job skill acquisition of their workers. The
workers, however, may be able to transfer these skills to alternative
jobs. In industries such as automaking that have strong unions
and large corporations, however, the investment asymmetry is prob-
ably not great. The level of the skills obtained from training and
from learning-by-doing is probably not such that training replace-
ments would be a major investment for an automaker and, there-
fore, would require a stronger bond with the union. The skills




61 The recurrence of the transaction variable will not be discussed because, in
the context of this Comment, the transactions are always recurring.
19821
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b. High Investment Specificity
High investment specificity is probably unlikely in the context
that this Comment addresses. Such investment means that the em-
ployee has acquired unique skills valuable to the employer. Yet,
"most of these individuals could move to another organization
without significant productivity losses." 62 Moreover, unified gov-
ernance in this context would require "merger" between the cor-
poration and the individual employees, but "limits on indenture
foreclose this option for labor-market transactions." 63 A corporation
cannot "buy" a uniquely qualified employee, and ordinarily the
employee is not able to purchase the corporation. Because most
investment germane to this Comment is of an intermediate degree,6 4
however, this situation is not particularly relevant.
c. High Level of Uncertainty
A high level of uncertainty is the most plausible rationale for
a need to shift from bilateral governance to some form of unilateral
governance. Instability that is either general to the economy or
specific to an industry or corporation may combine with the union's
mistrust of management assertions concerning the firm's economic
state and prospects, the necessity for austerity measures, or the de-
gree to which management is sharing in such measures. Higher
uncertainty also may be a natural result of the increasing size of
corporations and the complexity of our economy. As corporations
diversify into many different fields and decide-at management levels
far removed geographically and hierarchically from the shop floor-
to shift capital resources from one plant to another or one industry
to another, workers' sense of insecurity may justifiably increase.
Uncertainty thus may grow to a high enough level to warrant
a closer step to unified governance; Professor Williamson states
that "bilateral governance structures will often give way to unified
ones as uncertainty is increased." 65 The corporation and the union
alike may need unified governance to ensure that the maximum
benefits resulting from transaction-specific investments are accrued
62 Id. 257. This also, however, may indicate that the specific investment was
asymmetrical. Athletes and artists, for instance, would fall into the category the
quote addresses. In either case, unified governance in the high specificity situation
is not usually applicable to the environment examined by this Comment.
63 Id.
64 This is ninplicit in Williamson's discussion of collective bargaining in a section
on "[mlixed [tiransactions." Id. 255-57.
65 Id. 254.
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and that the relationship is close enough to weather difficult times
and unforeseen events.
4. Unified Governance in the Collective
Bargaining Context
Interpreting what unified governance would look like in the
labor-management context is difficult. Although Professor William-
son provides a general description of unified governance,6 6 he says
little about the labor market context. 67 "Merger" in the sense of
corporate takeover of the union of course would be totally ab-
horrent to our labor law and policy.68 Moreover, direct employee
ownership of the corporation raises serious economic questions,
even if it were otherwise feasible.6 9 Union representation on the
corporation's board of directors, however, provides an approxima-
tion of unified governance without sacrificing our national labor
policy.70 Thus, given the high degree of uncertainty in today's
complex and interdependent economic system, the most efficient
66 See supra text accompanying note 55.
0 7 Williamson saw unified governance as viable for labor/management only in
the high uncertainty, intermediate investment specificity case. See supra text ac-
companying notes 62-65. Unified governance in the high investment specificity
situation might approximate "complex contracts designed to tie the interests of the
individual to the organization on a long-term basis . . . ," Williamson, supra note
45, at 257, but the ultimate expression of unified governance in the labor-market
context would be employee or union ownership. For conflicting formal analyses of
the economic merits of worker ownership, see the articles cited supra note 20.
68 One might well ask why unified governance should imply union representa-
tion rather than direct employee representation. Conceptually, unified governance
is best seen as an extension of bilateral governance (collective bargaining). See
supra text accompanying note 56. Thus seen, it would involve the parties to the
collective agreement: the corporation and the union.
There are also some practical reasons supporting this role for the union. First,
a union representative would have the resources of the union at his disposal, making
him a more effective representative. Second, union representation would allow
better coordination of the representative's and the union's decisionmaking, so that
they would not work at cross-purposes. See Summers, Codetermination in the
United States: A Projection of Problems and Potentials, 4 J. Comp. CoRP. L. & SEc.
REc. 155, 184-85 (1982). Finally, union leaders are more experienced at
negotiating with top corporate officials, and hence would not be subject to the
combination of awe and fear that might hinder a worker discussing issues with
corporate directors for the first time. For an illuminating analysis of the kind of
shop organization that would be needed to allow effective worker representation in
nonunionized firms, see Summers, supra at 160-63.
69 See supra note 20. The problems workers face in attempting to shift the risk
of corporate failure would take on greater seriousness if the magnitude of the risk
increased. See supra section II B 2.
70 See Labor Management Relations [Taft-Hartley] Act, § 8(a) (2), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (2) (1976) (prohibits too close an interaction between union and employer
so that neither domination nor collusion results to the detriment of the workers).
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corporate organization form, at least in some sectors, may include
union representation of worker interests on the board of directors.7 1
D. Worker Representation and Organizational Slack
Substantial empirical evidence suggests that corporate bureauc-
racies do not operate as efficiently as they could. This inefficiency
has several causes, some of which are internal and some external to
the corporation. Union representation may help to reduce these
pervasive sources of inefficiency.
1. Internal Causes of Inefficiency
a. Organizational Slack
One cause of inefficiency in large corporations is endemic to the
bureaucracy qua complex organization. A great mass of literature
concerning complex organizations demonstrates that complex or-
ganizational forms inevitably breed unintended consequences. 2
These consequences stem from such phenomena as subgoal pursuit,73
information impactedness, 74 uncertainty absorption, 75 and specializa-
tion of communication functions. 6 Although the resulting "or-
ganizational slack" can be limited, it cannot be totally eliminated.77
71 The degree of uncertainty necessary to make union representation more effi-
cient than strict bilateral governance is uncertain. It could be argued that the
nature of large corporation collective bargaining is such that union representation is
always appropriate. Conversely, it could be argued that only a substantial short-
term probability of firm bankruptcy is sufficient. In any case, what is appropriate
for one firm or industry would not be necessarily appropriate for another.
The best approach for a court faced with this quandry is to let the parties de-
cide, because they are in the best position to know. See supra text accompanying
notes 28 & 31 (suggesting a presumption of efficiency when the union and the ap-
propriate corporate agents agree to union representation).
72 See generally J. MAcis & H. SIMON, O.cANIzATIONS 36-47 (1958).
73 "Subgoal pursuit" refers to optimization of an incomplete subset of an organi-
zation's goals or of a subunit's (an individual's or department's) goals at the expense
of the total organization. "Subgoals may replace broader goals as a part of the
whole process of replacing a complex reality with a simplified model of reality for
purposes of decision and action .... " Id. 157 (citation omitted). Subgoal pursuit
may also result from opportunistic behavior by individuals not fully committed to
organizational goals. See 0. WmL AMsomN, supra note 18, at 125.
74 "Information impactedness" refers to the combination of asymmetric distri-
bution of information-when only one (or a subset) of the parties to a transaction
can verify purported facts, giving those parties an incentive to make misrepresenta-
tions-and opportunism, a willingness to manipulate information and misrepresent
intentions. 0. WLLI.AMSON, supra note 18, at 31-33.
75 Uncertainty absorption occurs "when inferences are drawn from a body of
evidence and the inferences, instead of the evidence itself, are then communicated."
J. MAucn & H. SIMON, supra note 72, at 165.
76 Id. 166-69. "The existing pattern of communication will determine the rela-
tive frequency with which particular members of the organization will encounter
particular stimuli, or kinds of stimuli, in their search processes .. " Id. 168.
7 7 See generally J. MARca & H. SIMON, supra note 72, at 36-47, 169-71.
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Moreover, because the basic cause of the inefficiency is the structure
itself rather than, for example, the specific personnel chosen, the




A second, related cause of inefficiencies in large corporations is
the inability of the board of directors, which in theory represents
the interests of the shareholders, 79 to supervise managerial actions
effectively.8 0 This problem is at least partly structural in nature;
given the complexity of the organization and its environment,"'
directors do not have the time or other resources necessary to make
independent judgments concerning corporate policy. 2 It also may
be in part a matter of the type of individuals chosen as directors.
Most directors come from a narrow social class that may tend to be
unduly sympathetic to management.
8
2. External Causes: Capital Market Failure
Neither of these two internal sources of inefficiency could re-
sult in major distortions except in conjunction with the failure of
the capital markets to provide an effective check against internal
management inefficiency.84  Theoretically, the capital markets,
through threat of takeover, should preclude substantial manage-
ment inefficiency.85 Real capital markets, unfortunately, fall short
78Cf. 0. WnxLAmsoN, supra note 18, at 117-51 (discussing the transactional
limitations on firm size without changes in organizational form).
79 See supra text accompanying notes 9-12.
8oSee, e.g., M. MACE, DECTORS: MYTH AN PBArr (1971); Solomon,
Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope-Faint Promise?, 76
McH. L. Rzv. 581, 583-91 (1978). But cf. Eisenberg, Legal Models of Manage-
ment Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants,
63 CAi"a. L. REv. 375, 438 (1975) (arguing that the board could monitor manage-
ment effectively given an appropriate organizational structure).
81 See supra text accompanying notes 72-76.
82 Solomon, supra note 80, at 585-86.
83 Solomon, supra note 80, at 584-85. This problem is actually an indirect
result of the structural problems. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82. If
shareholders had the time, determination, and informational resources necessary for
them to make informed decisions independent of managements recommendations,
management would not be able to install "people who are economically and psycho-
logically sympathetic, if not indebted, to the chief executive officer and who are
therefore disinclined to challenge him." Solomon, supra note 80, at 584.
84 See generally F. ScHrum, supra note 28, at 37-38; 0. WmILIAmsoN, supra
note 18, at 141-43.
85 E.g., F. ScHEmm, supra note 28, at 37; 0. Wnr.IAmsoN, supra note 18, at
141. Stockholder suits are another potential limitation on managerial discretion,
id. 142, but are subject to the same problems as the takeover threat, see infra text
accompanying notes 87-89. See also Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New
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of this frictionless ideal: "[T]he available evidence provides at
best only weak support for the hypothesis that takeovers generate an
effective disciplinary mechanism against departures from profit
maximization." 86
This gap between theoretical ideals and practical reality re-
sults from two types of transaction costs: information impacted-
ness 87 and takeover costs. Information impactedness limits the
ability of takeover agents and shareholders to assess the degree of
management inefficiency, and thus diminishes the willingness of
the takeover agents to attempt takeover and of shareholders to be-
lieve the claims of such agents in takeover attempts.8  The second
type of transaction cost, the actual cost of the attempted takeover,
includes the costs of convincing shareholders about management
inefficiency and possible litigation costs.89 The combination of
these two types of transaction costs will lead potential takeover
agents to ignore otherwise attractive takeover opportunities, and
thus limits the ability of the capital markets to check management
inefficiency.
3. Union Representation's Impact on
Management Inefficiency
Union representation could reduce the inefficiency resulting
from organizational complexity, board-of-director ineffectualness,
and capital market distortions. The ability of the board of direc-
tors to monitor management would be reduced by the union di-
rector's use of intra-union communication channels to provide an
additional ongoing source of information to the board.90 Such an
informational source potentially could be quite productive, even if
the shareholder directors are suspicious of the information supplied.
Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Oficers, 77 YALE L.J.
1078, 1095-1103 (1968).
86 F. ScHERum, supra note 28, at 38; cf. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 18, at
142 ("[t]raditional capital market controls are relatively crude. ).
87 See supra note 74.
88 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 18, at 142.
89 Id. 142-43.
90 Economist Arthur F. Bums, former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board,
has pointed to a different communications impact as underlying his support of union
representation: "We want to educate some of these labor leaders .... I work on
the theory that, by sitting in on board meetings and studying the company's affairs,
they will learn something about the company's needs and problems .... " New
York Times, Apr. 27, 1980, § 3, at 14, col. 3-4. Both of these kinds of communi-
cations effects have been found by a government commission studying codetermina-
tion in West Germany. See Note, Employee Codetermination: Origins in Germany,
Present Practice in Europe, and Applicability to the United States, 14 HAnv. J.
I cis. 947, 960 (1977). See generally Summers, supra note 68, at 156-57, 183.
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At a minimum, the union-provided information, when it conflicted
with information provided by management, would alert the share-
holder directors to the need to take care in making important deci-
sions. At times, the union-provided information could have a
much greater impact, by illustrating the logical or practical flaws
in the management's reasoning.
Union directors also could help, to check management in-
efficiency because they could devote considerably more time to board
matters than independent outside directors, and because they would
not have the same sympathy for management as members of the
"closed club of elites." 91 Finally, union directors, because of their
independence, could bring to bear on management the threat of
.communication of managerial failings to two constituencies-the
workers and the shareholders. In each of -these ways, union
representation might result in a significant increase in management
efficiency.
E. Summary: The Economics of Union Representation
This section's economic analysis provides a plausible, though
necessarily qualitative, argument for allowing union representation
on corporate boards when agreed to as a product of collective bar-
gaining. Such representation based on voluntary agreements gen-
erally would have beneficial efficiency consequences. Union rep-
resenation would result in a more appropriate correspondence
between corporate control and risk-bearing and would lower trans-
action costs in the governance of the relationship between the union
and the corporation. In addition, union representation could re-
duce inefficiencies resulting from organizational complexity, board-
"of-director ineffectualness, and capital market failure.92
91 Solomon, supra note 80, at 586.
92 The successful West German experience with codetermination provides at
least some support for the conclusions of this section despite two important differ-
ences from the type of representation contemplated in this Comment: its compulsory
character in Germany and the bilevel German corporate board structure, with
mandatory worker representation solely on the upper, supervisory ooard. See
generally Note, supra note 90, at 949-62. According to a board chairman in the
West German steel industry, codetermination "is definitely a system of conflict
disentanglement and conflict resolution that is of great benefit to the development
of our industry and our economy." Id. 959 n.32 (originally quoted in Busnm-ss
INTERNATIONAL, INDusTRIAL DamocnAcy iN EUROPE 34 (1974)). A West German
government commission has found that codetermination has resulted in facilitation
of labor-management communication, greater, labor-management cooperation, in-
creased employee job security,' and reduced industrial strife. Id. 960 (footnotes
omitted).
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III. UNION REPRESENTATION, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,
AND THE NATURE OF THE CORPORATION
The preceding analysis has developed a strong economic ra-
tionale for union representation on corporate boards. It is now
necessary to assess the compatibility of union representation with
important noneconomic policies. The next two sections examine
the institutional compatibility of union representation with the
process of collective bargaining and with our legal model of the
corporation.
A. Industrial Stability, Democracy, and
Collective Bargaining
Union representation on corporate boards is consonant with
the policies underlying our labor laws as they have been inter-
preted and developed over the past forty years. As Congress de-
clared in the National Labor Relations Act, the legislation addressed
a situation that could
lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or un-
rest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of bur-
dening or obstructing commerce....
Experience has proved that protection by law of the
right of employees to organize and bargain collectively...
promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recog-
nized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging
practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of indus-
trial disputes .... 93
Since the National Labor Relations Act's enactment, stability
of industrial relations has been a frequently mentioned guiding
policy for courts to follow. Thus, for example, as arbitration be-
came "the substitute for industrial strife," 94 the employer's agree-
9 3 National Labor Relations Act § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). See also the
Labor Management Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976):
Industrial strife which interferes with the normal flow of commerce
and with the full production of articles and commodities for commerce,
can be avoided or substantially minimized if employers, employees, and
labor organizations each recognize under law one another's legitimate
rights in their relations with each other....
It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote the
full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees
and employers in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly
and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the
legitimate rights of the other....
94 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960).
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ment to arbitrate was interpreted as the quid pro quo for the
union's agreement not to strike.95 This judicial interpretation
"expresse[d] a federal policy . . . that industrial peace can best
be obtained only in that way." 91 The collective bargaining process
consistently has been the judiciary's method of ensuring industrial
stability.
97
Collective bargaining also represents another fundamental
policy. The social and political movement that led to the emphasis
placed on collective bargaining in our labor laws began as a general
movement for industrial democracy. 98 Indeed, "[t]he theme that
our system of political democracy should be matched by a system of
industrial democracy has been an irrepressible one in our history." 19
This can be seen in the oft-quoted words of Louis D. Brandeis:
The end to which we must move is a recognition of indus-
trial democracy as the end to which we are to work ...
There must be a division not only of the profits, but a
division of responsibilities; and the men must have the
opportunity of deciding, in part, what shall be their condi-
tion and how the business shall be run.
100
Union board representation of employees is not a substitute
for the collective bargaining process. Rather, it serves as a com-
95 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455, 458 (1957)
("Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an
agreement not to strike. . . . [Tihe Norris-LaGuardia Act does, indeed, indicate a
congressional policy toward settlement of labor disputes by arbitration .... .
96 Id. 455.
97 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at
578 ("The present federal policy is to promote industrial stabilization through the
collective bargaining agreement.") (footnote omitted).
98 See Summers, Industrial Democracy: America's Unfulfilled Promise, 28 CLEv.
ST. L. REv. 29, 29-30 (1979).
99 Id. 29 (footnote omitted).
100 Testimony of Louis D. Brandeis before the Commission on Industrial Rela-
tions. U.S. ComissioN oNq INDUSThrAL RELATIONS, FwAiL REPORT or rm Com-
MssIo, oN IDusTRAL RELATONS 81, 83-84 (1915), quoted in Summers, su1pra
note 98, at 32 (emphasis added). According to Professor Wellington,
The production line is emasculating, and thus the quest must be to restore
manhood to man. It is dehumanizing, and thus the worker must again be
made human. It is uncreative, and thus the man at his machine must be
given a creative outlet. Participation in industrial government is a way
to achieve these goals.
H. ,ELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PnocEss 26-27 (1968). Note that Pro-
fessor Wellington refers to "[plarticipation in industrial government," not more
specifically to collective bargaining,, as a way to achieve these goals. Id. 27. See
also P. BLUMBERC, INDUSTRiAL DE xOcRUcY 123 (1968) ("There is hardly a study
in the entire literature which fails to demonstrate that satisfaction in work is
enhanced . . . from a genuine increase in workers" decision-making power.").
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plement to 101 and an extension of an institutional process that has
changed significantly since its origin. Collective bargaining has
been marked by greater centralization and consolidation; 102 the
scope of bargaining has expanded to encompass matters formerly
considered management prerogatives; 103 and accommodation and
cooperation increasingly have replaced confrontation. 104 Illustra-
tive of this last development is the growing use of joint labor-
management committees to deal with a wide array of problems.1 5
Union board representation is both a logical culmination of
these developments 100 and a further expansion of union influ ence
into what previously was regarded as management's domain. Board
representation would provide the union with direct input into deci-
sions presently beyond the pale of collective bargaining.'7
Unlike an expansion of the scope of collective bargaining,
however, union representation would engender a cooperative rather
than an adversarial relationship. 08 Because of its adversarial na-
ture, the collective bargaining process "may not always represent
101 Professor Summers suggests that
probably the most significant impact of codetermination on collective
bargaining would be to provide the union with information concerning the
enterprise that it could use when developing its bargaining policy ...
Union access to this information . . .would not interfere with, but would
enhance, good faith bargaining. . . . Collective bargaining would become
less a poker game and more a process of solving real problems.
Summers, supra note 68, at 165-66.
102 For example, certain industries now bargain on an industrywide basis. The
unions in such industries make a collective bargaining agreement with a single
employers association instead of company by company within the industry.
103 See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964)
(subcontracting).
1
0 4 A AmnTy, WoaKE PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT DEcIsroN-NAKNG
IN WESTE r EuoPoE 32 (Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. No. 79-136E, Apr. 23, 1979).
105 Id. 33. See generally id. 33-41.
10 6 See Note, supra note 90, at 987-91.
107 See, e.g., First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981)
(no duty to bargain over partial plant closings); N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1979, at D1,
col. 1 (plant closings).
108 See Note, supra note 90, at 988.
Professor Summers argues that:
[T]he form and language of confrontation obscures the mutuality of interest
between employees and employer... . Representation on the board can
help employees recognize these mutual interests, and by providing them
with more complete and reliable information concerning the profitability
and prospects of the enterprise it can make them more ready to accept
terms at the bargaining table that will promote the common long-run
goal of success of the enterprise.
... Confrontation might well be significantly reduced at the bargain-
ing table, and this would modify the character of collective bargaining.
Not everyone would count this a loss.
Summers, supra note 68, at 164.
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the most"effective means of insuring that the employee viewpoint
is taken into account in the formulation of basic corporate poli-
cies . . 109 Although the adversarial posture of collective bar-
gaining appropriately reflects the directly conflicting interests of
workers and shareholders with respect to wages and some other
basic issues, the more cooperative orientation of union representa-
tion would be more appropriate where worker and shareholder
interests conflict less completely."10 Moreover, because the issues
addressed on the director level often are not discussed during
the bargaining process, the more cooperative nature of union board
representation may be the only way for the worker viewpoint ever
to be considered by a nonreceptive management. Thus utilized,
union representation would complement effectively the workings
of the collective bargaining process.
B. Union Representation and the Nature
of the Corporation
The traditional view of the publicly-held company is that it is
a maximizer of shareholder stock value,"" and that the directors
of the company should represent the interests of the shareholders,
whose pecuniary fates are in the hands of management. This con-
ception of the corporation is unsound. The proposition that share-
holders even indirectly manage the publicly-held corporation has
little empirical support.1 2  It is, moreover, appropriate that the
shareholders lack plenary control, because shareholders are less in
need of protection than are other groups. 113
109 Id.
11o For example, these interests may be more consonant with respect to overall
productivity or quality control improvements. According to Professor Summers:
"There is little danger that codetermination will detract from or under-
mine collective bargaining. Instead, codetermination will supplement col-
lective bargaining and can strengthen and improve it. The real danger
runs in quite the other direction-that the confrontation attitudes of col-
lective bargaining will be carried into the board room and frustrate
codetermination.
Summers, supra note 68, at 166.
Ill See, e.g., J. HmRsHLEiFER, supra note 22, at 229 ("In the traditional formula-
tion, the firm is said to maximize profit . . . to attract the resources [of share-
holders].") (emphasis in original).
112 Stockholders generally are in a very poor position to govern. The indi-
vidual shareholder may have only a small percentage of the corporation's stock.
In addition, the shareholder's portfolio may contain so many different companies'
stocks, for the purposes of diversifying away risks of monetary loss, that she/he has
little interest in corporate governance. The cost of becoming well-informed may
exceed greatly the benefits. See M. MACE, supra note 80, at 68-69. See generally
Solomon, supra note 80, at 583-87.
il See supra section IIB; Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of
Law, in THE ConpORATroi IN MoDEm SociETY 40 (E. Mason ed. 1959) ("The
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Large corporations have a pervasive influence on our society:
The modern stock corporation is a social and eco-
nomic institution that touches every aspect of our lives;
in many ways it is an institutionalized expression of our
way of life. During the past 50 years, industry in cor-
porate form has moved from the periphery to the very
center of our social and economic existence. Indeed, it is
not inaccurate to say that we live in a corporate society.
114
The validity of this statement by the then vice-president and gen-
eral counsel of Ford Motor Company has only increased in the 23
years since it was made. "It follows that . . . [corporations] bear
large responsibility for the quality and tone of American life." 115
Corporations certainly have an impact beyond shareholders alone,
yet shareholders are the sole group (other than management) with
any evident representation on the board of directors. Reforms pro-
posed to redress this imbalance have included greater emphasis on
outside directors 116 and election of public interest directors by
groups other than the shareholders.
117
market affords [the shareholder] a way of breaking this relation [to the corporation]
that is simple and effective. He can sell his stock .... "). Chayes concluded that
"[olf all those standing in relation to the large corporation, the shareholder is least
subject to its power. . . . Their interests are protected if financial information is
made available, fraud and overreaching are prevented, and a market is maintained
in which their shares may be sold. Id. 40.
11
4
W. GossErr, CORPORATE CrrIzENsmP 157 (1957); see also Chayes, supra
note 113, at 26:
Concern with the modern corporation is intensified to the extent that its
activities have necessarily ramified beyond the economic sphere of pro-
duction of goods and service.
Across a widening range of activity, the large corporations have be-
come principal factors. They are the chief agencies of private research.
They are the hope of fund raisers for institutions of higher learning and
the principal consumers of the products of those institutions. Their adver-
tising supports newspapers and sponsors TV programs. They are a leading,
if not the leading, purveyor of influence and pressure on public officials in
Washington and state capitals.
See generally C. LINDBLOM, supra note 34, at 170-88, 201-21.
115 Chayes, supra note 113, at 26. "This attribution of responsibility is not a
token of hostility to the large private corporation. What has been said amounts to
no more than that the great corporation is the dominant nongovernmental institu-
tion of modern American life." Id. 27.
116 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 404-09.
117 E.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMNuG THE GIAr CORORATION
123-26 (1976); C. STONE, WHxERE THE LAw ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF Con-
PoRATE BEHAVIOR 152-83 (1975). For other scholarly criticism and proposals, see,
e.g., R. NADER, supra; R. Dahl, A Prelude to Corporate Reform, 1972 Bus. & Soc'y
REv. 17, 19-20, reprinted in CoRPoRATE SocIAL POLICY 18, 20-21 (R. Heilbroner &
P. London, eds., 1975). Professor Gower refers to the very similar English legal
model as "unreal" and "increasingly anachronistic." L. Gowzn, GowE 's PRINCIPLES
OF MODERmN CoMPA.NY LAw 578 (4th ed. 1979) (citation omitted).
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Among "the various "disenfranchised" groups affected by cor-
porate decisions, workers have the strongest and clearest claim to
representation." 8 Moreover, although worker board representation
may be justified on grounds separate from shareholder welfare,". a
radical shift from the traditional goal of maximizing shareholder
welfare is not necessary to rationalize such representation. The
courts can rely on the express vote of the shareholders or their
representatives, the board, as an indication that effective union
representation is in the shareholders' long-run interests.
120
In addition, allowing the board to consider the welfare of the
corporation's employees is not a radical break from present law.
In recognition of the impact of the development of the large
modern corporation, the legal structure already has provided for
some worker input into corporate affairs: wages, hours, and in-
numerable working conditions currently are determined through
collective bargaining between the union and the corporate man-
agement. Furthermore, some courts have been willing to allow
boards of directors to make decisions benefiting employees and
other groups, at least when such decisions conceivably advanced
the shareholders' long-run interests. 121  Thus, rather than being
a complete break with legal tradition, allowing for union board
representation of worker interests merely would be a more explicit
indication of an emerging conception of the corporation, 22 a con-
1IS L. GowEr, supra note 117, at 10-11 (referring to "the undoubted fact that
the employees are members of the company for which they work to a far greater
extent than are the shareholders .... "); Blumberg, supra note 3, at 553 ("of all
the groups affected by the corporation, including the stockholders, it is the employees
upon whom the corporation has the most important impact-an impact that is con-
tinuous, pervasive and profound."). An incidental benefit of the workers' strong
claim is that union representation, unlike that of other groups, including shareholders,
can be expected to result in the presence of directors on the board who are not only
independent in character but who have the time, determination, and access to inde-
pendent sources of information necessary for effective supervision of management.
See supra note 68 and text accompanying note 91.
119 See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 113; supra note 117.
120 See supra section II A.
121 See supra notes 9 & 17.
122 Among the groups now conceived as outside the charmed circle of
corporate membership, but which ought to be brought within it, the most
important and readily identifiable is its work-force. It is instructive to
observe how, almost unconsciously, our legal and political system has
worked to give this "constituency" a "say" in the governance of the
corporation.
... [w]orkers have organized their own unions. . . . This was essentially
the structural and institutional invention of the Wagner Act. . . . The
* negotiation of a labor contract can . . . fruitfully be seen as an effort to
adjust the relations of both parties so that their common ends may be pur-
sued jointly and they will not needlessly interfere with each other in the
pursuit of their separate ends.
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ception that recognizes the pervasive -influence of corporations on
groups other than shareholders, and that therefore allows such
other groups to check and channel corporate influence.
IV. Tim PROPOSED STANDARDS AND THEIR APPLICATION
This Comment has attempted to demonstrate that union
representation is desirable on grounds of economic efficiency, and
that it comports well with the traditional and evolving scope of
collective bargaining and with the emerging legal theory of the
nature of the corporation. The following section will examine
what legal standards should govern a union representative on a
board of directors and how these standards would best be imple-
mented and applied.
A. The General Standard
The union board representative's principal fiduciary responsi-
bility should be to the employees in the bargaining unit represented
by the union. When employee interests are implicated, the union
board director's sole fiduciary duty should be to further those
interests. When specific employee interests are not directly in-
volved, however, the union director should have the usual director's
fiduciary duty to advance the corporation's interests. Thus, he or
she should not be able to ignore corporate interests except when
attempting to increase employee welfare. 123 In particular, a union
representative must not be permitted to advance his or her own
private interests at the expense of the corporation, unless such
advancement is unavoidably incidental to a good faith effort to
further worker interests.
24
Chayes, supra note 113, at 41-42. See also Note, Codetermination in Industr:-
Why Are They Saying All Those Good Things About It?, 35 U. TORONTO FAcULTY
L. RFv. 217, 217 (1977):
In its broadest sense, [worker representation] purports to institution-
alize the right of employees to have a voice in the making of decisions
which affect them. To the extent which our own labour relations law guar-
antees every person the right to join a trade union which management is
compelled to recognize and to negotiate with Canadian employees have the
legal right to codetermine decisions relating to the work place (citation
omitted).
123 It should be noted that employees and shareholders have concurrent interests
in the general financial health of the corporation. It is therefore highly unlikely that
a union representative would, in properly carrying out his or her duties, have cause
to do substantial injury to shareholder interests. Even a completely worker-controlled
firm might require capital investment to continue its existence. To attract such
capital, it probably would have to provide a normal return to the investors of capital.
Cf. Note, supra note 90, at 961 (indicating that employee directors in Germany
have supported management efforts to increase corporate profitability).
124 Thus, the usual rules with respect to, e.g., usurping corporate opportunities
(non-union-related), conflict of interest, and insider trading,- would apply. See
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Employees should be permitted to bring derivative suits in
either of two situations. First, if the union representative fails to
attempt to advance employee interests that are implicated in board
decisionmaking, then a right of action should be available on
behalf of the employees. Second, if specific employee interests are
.not directly involved, the union director should be amenable to
suit for any violation of his or her fiduciary duty to further the
corporation's welfare, because the employees' welfare is closely,
even if indirectly, linked to the corporation's financial health.
In the latter case, unfortunately, the negative impact on the
corporation of fraud and other kinds of improper action by a union
representative would affect employees only indirectly, and often
would not be apparent to them. The harm to shareholders, on the
other hand, would be much more direct.125 To protect the interests
of both shareholders and employees, therefore, the shareholders also
should have a right of action against union representatives on the
board when the act in question was not part of a good faith
effort to advance employee interests. Denying the shareholders
this right of action would be a greater infringement on the policy
behind the usual standard of the corporate director's fiduciary duty
than is necessary to allow effective union representation, and would
promote director malfeasance at the expense of both shareholders
and employees.
1 26
B. Implementation of the Standards
The best way to implement the standards offered by this
Comment would be by statute. A properly drafted statute authoriz-
ing union representation would clarify the parties' legal relation-
ships ex ante. This would encourage parties who otherwise would
be fearful of legal complications to try union representation. A
generally H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF COBPoRATIoNs AND OTHER BusINEss
ENTERPI SES 457-74 (2d ed. 1970).
125 Because all corporate profits belong to the shareholders in the final instance
(at liquidation), any diminution in corporate assets has a direct impact on share-
holder interests. Workers have no direct claim on corporate profits-they have
bargained for a fixed wage. Of course, how much the union can bargain for depends
on the corporation's financial health, but the impact of fraud, for example, would be
indirect, at least in the absence of profit-sharing.
126 Note that the proposals offered here relate to the director's fiduciary duty.
Other duties of a corporate director would also apply to a union representative
Thus, for example, the union representative would be held to the usual standards
with respect to negligence. These duties should normally be enforceable by either
shareholders or employees if they can show the requisite injury in fact. See generallyj
C. WrIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 42-52 (3d ed. 1976)
(discussing the law on standing).
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statute also might encourage experiments in union representation
by giving such experiments a symbolic stamp of legitimacy. 27
Any such statute, however, should be quite general. The
statute should state that the usual fiduciary-duty standard for a
corporate director would not apply to a union representative on
the board of directors. Instead, the union official's duty would be
the standard proposed by this Comment: a duty to employees first,
then to the corporation as a whole when specific worker interests
are not involved directly. 28 Because any lawsuits against union
representatives for breach of fiduciary duty will raise new issues
and complex value conflicts, the courts should be given the oppor-
tunity to define the standard more specifically on a case-by-case
basis. Reliance on such an approach allows amorphous standards
such as "good faith" to be applied in concrete factual settings. The
courts can balance the equities involved in each case. This ap-
proach will serve to prevent premature adoption of overly rigid
legal standards.
In the absence of a statute, the courts should legitimize such
experiments by applying the standards proposed in this Comment.
The courts have developed the common law of the fiduciary duties
of trustees generally 129 and of corporate directors in particular. 80
Implementing and applying legal standards for union represent-
atives would involve only a further refining of those standards, and
thus would be well within the courts' competence. 181
127 Cf. H. WELLNGTO,'J, supra note 100, at 46 ("The Wagner Act put govern-
ment behind the unions at least to the extent that it made collective bargaining
legitimate.").
12 8 See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
129 See generally G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, Trao LAw oF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§§ 2-8 (2d ed. 1965).
130 See H. HEN, supra note 124, at 451 (discussing the common law basis of
the fiduciary duty of corporate directors).
181 It has been suggested, however, that, when a union bargains with more than
one firm in an industry, the statutory law of interlocking directorates may prevent
union representation unless modified. See Steuer, Employee Representation on the
Board: Industrial Democracy or Interlocking Directorate?, 16 COLUM. THANSNAT'L
L. 255, 274-96 (1977). But see Summers, supra note 68, at 169-70. The suscep-
tibility of the relevant statutory provisions to a judicial construction allowing union
representation is uncertain and beyond the scope of this Comment, but amendment
of the statute may be required. See Steuer, supra, at 274-96.
Another statutory change that would be very desirable is amendment of section
8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976), to make
union representation a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. Note, supra note
90, at 1008.
For a general discussion of the possible antitrust ramifications of union repre-
sentation, see Steuer, supra, at 270-74; Summers, supra note 68, at 179-83. The
possible antitrust problems may be less serious than these authors-especially Steuer
-suggest. First, if union officials on the board of'one company were to take into
account the direct impact of their actions on employees in other companies, this
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C. Application of the Standards
Despite the obvious dangers involved in abstract speculation in
the absence of a concrete factual setting, some indications of how
the courts should apply the proposed standards are given below.
Particular emphasis is placed on highlighting the different share-
holder and employee values implicated in each situation.
1. Access to Information
Corporate directors commonly enjoy a broad right of inspection
of corporate books and records. 132 The application of this Com-
ment's standards for a union board representative would provide
the union director with the same right of access to information. 133
The principal reason supporting such a rule is that the union
official's representation of worker interests would be rendered in-
effective if the union director did not have this access. The in-
creased ability to scrutinize management closely, checking its
excesses and inefficiencies, is perhaps the primary benefit of rep-
might actually enhance efficiency by internalizing external costs, see supra note 24.
It is, of course, possible that there would be an offsetting anticompetitive effect,
but this efficiency gain should at least partly allay fears.
Second, Steuer misleads when he suggests that "[tlo the extent that the workers'
salaries and job security are dependent upon the profitability of the enterprise, they
will have a powerful incentive to help boost their company's revenue at the expense
of competition." Steuer, supra, at 272. Although it is true that officials of a union
that represented workers at only one firm in an industry would have strong incen-
tives (although probably little ability) to help that firm gain monopoly power in
the industry by increasing its market share, it is not clear that the officers of a union
that bargained on an industry-wide level would generally have the same incentive.
Such anticompetitive activity would, in order to have the desired effect of increasing
profits, have to decrease industry output, see generally F. ScrBaEn, supra note 28,
at 151-68, with a consequent loss of employment. Thus, any resulting wage gains-
which would be speculative, because the union could not use legal means of redress
to enforce an agreement-would be counterbalanced by layoffs of union members.
It is not immediately obvious that this would generally be a desirable tradeoff for
union officials, especially if laid-off union members retain the right to vote in union
elections. But see United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
This same analysis would also apply to industry-wide union anticompetitive action
short of outright collusion with management. Thus, although there are certainly
some incentives to anticompetitive behavior, the economic incentives are not one-
sided. This suggests that the antitrust laws might well be adequate to deter most
of whatever potential for collusion would be created by union representation.
132 See H. HEmN, supra note 124, at § 216 ("Directors as individuals enjoy, on
common-law principles, a right, termed 'absolute' in some and 'qualified' in other
jurisdictions, to inspect the corporate books and records, as corollary to their duties
to keep informed on corporate matters."). See also the cases compiled in Annot.,
15 A.L.R.2d 11 (1951).
133 For an exception, see infra text accompanying notes 144-46. In addition,
the union representative's right of inspection should not extend to records not other-
wise available to the union concerning the conduct and strategy of ongoing grievance
proceedings.
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resentation for the employees. 3 4 The union representative would
,be handicapped severely in his or her ability to monitor manage-
ment without the chance to examine these records of management's
performance.
If a union representative should, however, attempt to go on
an extended fishing expedition through corporate records, it may
be necessary for a court to delimit this privilege. In any case when
it is asked to do so, the court should balance carefully the director's
legitimate need for the information to carry out his role as the
employees' representative against the need to avoid disruption of
the corporation's ongoing business. Because of the importance of
union access to such information, a court should limit this privilege
only if it is used to harass management intentionally. The burden
of proving at least a prima facie case of such intent should be on
management. 3 5
2. Confidentiality of Information
This Comment's standards yield the following rule regarding
confidentiality: a union representative may release information
obtained through his position on the board when such release rep-
resents a good-faith effort to advance specific employee interests;
when specific employee interests are not directly involved, however,
the usual director prohibitions against releasing information detri-
mental to the corporation and advancing a director's private in-
terests would apply.13 6
134 One indication of the importance of information exchange to both union and
corporation is the growing trend of establishment of joint labor-management com-
mittees, one of whose main functions is often exchange of information. See A.
AmAury, supra note 104, at 33-41. See generally id. 7; supra note 90 and accom-
panying text.
This Comment has enumerated two causes of managerial inefficiency, stemming
from both internal and external sources. See supra text following note 71. The
right of access addresses both sources. The information obtained by the union
representative's right of access is necessary to discern the internal sources of in-
efficiencies. The external cause is the failure of the capital markets to perceive the
internal managerial inefficiency and to correct by the threat or actuality of takeovers.
See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text. The use and publicizing of the
obtained information-the confidentiality of such information is dealt with infra
notes 136-42 and accompanying text-is necessary to inform the capital markets to
ensure their more competent regulation of internal managerial inefficiency.
135 Management could establish a prima facie case of intent to harass by show-
ing that the effect is to hamper severely the conduct of business. The union then
would have the burden of showing some legitimate purpose in seeking the information.
136 See supra text accompanying notes 9-11. See generally 3 W. FLETCHm,
supra note 31, at §§ 884-906. For a further limitation related to the union repre-
sentative's ability to release confidential corporate information, see infra text follow-
ing note 141 and text accompanying note 142.
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This rule provides a reasonable standard for three reasons.
First, this rule is merely the logical and necessary corollary of the
prior rule giving union directors access to such information; it
likewise is required to effectuate the union director's representation
of employee interests.137 The increased oversight of management
by direct observation and by access to pertinent data is unhelpful
if the uncovered management inefficiencies cannot be revealed
publicly or used for bargaining leverage.138 Moreover, there are
few other benefits of such board membership when the union
representation is only a small percentage of total board votes. 3
9
The second reason this rule is reasonable is that applying a
more stringent restriction would be impracticable. Prohibiting
disclosure of information by the union representative would re-
quire him or her to mislead other union officials intentionally
whenever confidential information led the representative to support
union positions or actions different from those that appeared best
to other union officials. The result of such deception would be
either loss of faith by workers and other union leaders in the rep-
resentative's abilities or acquiescence by the others based on the
assumption that he knew more than they did. Either result would
be undesirable, the former because it would create strains among
the union leadership, and the latter because it would provide the
board representative with an unnecessary increase in power relative
to other union officials, with a consequent diminishing of internal
union democracy.
The third justification for the confidentiality rule proposed by
this Comment is that to require otherwise would raise very serious
questions concerning the union representative's duty under
Landrum-Griffin section 501.140 Such withholding of information
would seem to contravene explicitly the command of section 501
to "refrain from dealing with the [union] as an adverse party." 141
The union representative's freedom under this rule would not
be unbounded, however. Disclosure of otherwise confidential in-
formation would have to be part of a good-faith effort to advance
employee interests. In order to preserve the interests of the stock-
holders to the greatest extent possible, moreover, there should be
13 7 See supra note 134.
138 See supra note 134.
139 U.A.W. president Fraser is one of eighteen Chrysler board members. See
New York Times, Nov. 26, 1979, at D9, col. 4.
140 See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure [Landrum-Griffin] Act
§501, 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1976).
141 Id.
1982]
954 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
a strong presumption that legitimate trade secrets, such as product
specifications, marketing strategies, and patented information, do
not fall into the category of information that the union representa-
tives may release. This presumption is needed because the stock-
holders' interests are particularly implicated in the confidentiality
of this kind of information. Furthermore, any relationship between
release of this kind of information and employee welfare usually
will be very indirect and speculative.
142
3. Collective Bargaining Strategy
Board discussion of collective bargaining strategy is one area
in which board representation of worker interests makes no sense.
To provide a union representative with a legal right to participate
in discussions of this type would conflict with the adversarial model
of collective bargaining that has been adopted in the United
States,143 and would provide the union with an unfair advantage in
that process. Hence, the union representative should be required
to absent himself from such board discussions (unless invited to
participate). 44 For similar reasons the union representative's right
of access to corporate information should be limited not only by
the normal standard for a corporate director,145 but also with re-
spect to information about strategy for ongoing and forthcoming
collective bargaining.
46
142One example of an allowable disclosure would be to a legal counselor. Such
a counselor should then be held to a duty of confidentiality. "Judging from the
experience in Germany and Scandinavia, serious breaches of confidentiality would be
unlikely to occur." Note, supra note 90, at 992. For a very thoughtful discussion
of the confidentiality issue, see Summers, supra note 68, at 170-73. Summers sug-
gests that the corporation's need for secrecy has been exaggerated. Id.
'
4 3 See generally Murphy, supra note 2, at 760-61.
144 Douglas Fraser, U.A.W. president and Chrysler director, indicated shortly
before his election to the Chrysler board that "he would stay out of all board actions
dealing directly with collective bargaining strategy but would take full part in dis-
cussion and votes on everything else, including basic policies on collective bargaining.
Raskin, The Labor Leader as Company Director, New York Times, Apr. 27,
1980, at F15, col. 1. This is a reasonable distinction as long as board discussion of
these "general policies" would not result in disclosure to the union representative of
information concerning short-term collective bargaining strategy.
One advantage of making discussion of the subject of union representation part
of the collective bargaining process is that disputes over issues such as what meet-
ings the union representative would be barred from can be resolved privately through
mechanisms set up by the collective agreement. For example, the parties could
indicate that all such disputes were to be resolved by binding arbitration. Where
no such express provisions are found, but the wording of the collective agreement's
arbitration clause is broad, the courts should require the parties to submit such dis-
putes to the arbitrator.
145 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
146This rule should be construed narrowly to prevent abuse by the rest of the
board of directors. For example, although plant closings arguably affect collective
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4. Industry-Wide Bargaining
In certain situations the union bargains on an industry-wide
basis. In those industries the union board representative should be
allowed to take into account the welfare of all workers in the in-
dustry, rather than a particular corporation's employees alone. The
interest of the union is industry-wide, and to require a union rep-
resentative to consider only the interests of workers in one firm
would injure the union's interests by lessening its ability to coordi-
nate its policies on an industry-wide basis.
5. Contrary Agreements
The precise standards adopted by the courts for the powers
of a union board representative for the most part should be
flexible enough to apply only when the parties have made no ex-
press agreement to the contrary. Parties considering experimenting
with union representation in general should be free to structure it
to meet the specific needs of the union and corporation involved.
This freedom would encourage such experiments.
This flexibility should not, of course, extend to the union rep-
resentative's fiduciary duty to the union members or allow the par-
ties to override any important public policies. Certainly, the union
official's duty to represent worker interests should not be considered
waivable by agreement between the union and the corporation.
The beneficiary of the duty-the worker-would have no input into
such a decision, which would frustrate the requirements of adequate
employee representation embodied in the section 501 statutory
provisions. 147
V. CONCLUSION
Because of the problem of conflicting fiduciary duties to share-
holders and employees, union representation on corporate boards
is problematical under current legal standards. A union official
serving on a corporate board would in many cases be forced to
choose between breaching his duty to employees in the union's
bargaining unit and breaching the usual corporate director's duty
bargaining strategy, normally they are not even subject to mandatory bargaining.
See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLBB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). In any event,
the exception is for discussions of collective bargaining strategy, not of issues that
might affect or arise in collective bargaining.
147 Cf. Serving Two Masters, supra note 14, at 648 ("Courts . . . have found
violations of section 501 only in two extreme situations. First, they have intervened
when union officials manipulated democratic procedures within a union. In these
circumstances, employees may be unable to ensure that their interests are protected.").
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to the shareholders. This Comment has therefore examined the
desirability of modifying the current legal standards to allow rep-
resentation of worker interests on the corporate board.
Although the economic effects of union representation are
somewhat speculative, there is reason to believe that significant
gains in efficiency would result. Voluntary union representation
would be likely to reduce transaction costs in the governance of
the collective bargaining agreement and would reduce the ability
of management to run the corporation so as to further their own
interests rather than those of the shareholders. This likelihood of
increased efficiency provides important support for this Comment's
conclusion that the usual director's fiduciary duty should be modi-
fied to permit union representation on the employees' behalf.
Examination of the policies underlying collective bargaining
provides additional support for union representation. Union rep-
resentation is seen best as an extension of the collective bargaining
process, and as a complementary mechanism for furthering the
labor law objectives of promoting industrial democracy and re-
ducing industrial strife. Moreover, union representation experi-
ments would permit an exploration of the contours and ramifica-
tions of an emerging conception of the corporation as a community
of interests.
This Comment's proposed standards for union representatives
for the most part merely redirect the corporate director's fiduciary
duty from shareholder to employee. In applying the standards,
though, the implications of different possible rules for the different
interests involved must be weighed in order to avoid injustice to
shareholder, employee, or union.
[VOL 130:919
